The Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Estimated population 170 million

Population density (people per square mile) 611

Population doubling time 38 years

GDP per capita US$ 1,275

Population doubling time in years:

USA 79. Canada 81. Germany declining. UK 248. Russia declining. China 110. Philippines 41.

Population density (people per square mile)

USA 85. Canada 9. Germany 593. UK 660. Russia 21. China 368. Philippines 795.

GDP per capita in US$:

RECENT HISTORY

Formerly part of British colonial India. Upon Indian independence in 1947, the Muslim League not wanting to remain part of a multicultural, multi-religious India, created Pakistan as a country independent of India and based solely on establishing an Islamist religious country.

The newly independent Pakistan consisted of two distinct parts: the smaller but more densely populated East Pakistan, and the much larger West Pakistan. The country's government was associated with a British-inherited parliamentary system, containing a strong central government as well as governments in the several provinces that also gave it a federal form. However, in 1971, after the country had experienced more than two decades of turbulent politics, the eastern region seceded and established itself as the independent state of Bangladesh. In the aftermath of that event, Pakistan (now reduced to the former West Pakistan) faced a number of political and economic problems and uncertainties about its future.

Several seemingly irreconcilable domestic conflicts have left their mark on the politics of Pakistan. The first of these occurred at the highest levels of leadership, involving the key political actors from the political parties, the higher bureaucracy, and the upper echelon of the armed forces (notably the Pakistani army). Constitutions in Pakistan have been less about limiting the power of authority and more a legal justification for arbitrary action. The country's several constitutions reflected more the pre-eminence of the person holding the highest office than the restrictions imposed on authority, and the national government consistently has been more personalized than institutionalized. Struggles for power are therefore more personal than constitutional. In addition the military often felt compelled to intervene in the country's political affairs when it perceived that civilian leadership was unable to govern. The result has been several military administrations (1958–69, 1969–71, 1977–88, and 1999–2008), which ruled Pakistan for roughly half of its history.

A second conflict has taken place between regional groups. The different cultural and historical circumstances, as well as natural and human endowments of those regions, have tested the unity of Pakistan time and again; the loss of East Pakistan demonstrated the failure of Pakistan's leaders to orchestrate a workable program of national integration. The demands for an independent Sindhu Desh for the Sindhis and a Pakhtunistan for the Pathans, and the violently rebellious circumstances in Balochistan in the 1980s and since 2002, illustrate the nature and depth of the problem of national integration. Because these various struggles have been directed against centralized authority, they have merged with the democratic struggle. But their express aims have been to secure greater regional representation in the bureaucratic and military establishment, especially in the higher echelons, and to achieve effective decentralization of powers within the federal system by emphasizing regional autonomy.

A third conflict sprang from the struggle over economic resources and development funds among the more-deprived regions and strata of the population. This resulted in a number of violent confrontations between the less-privileged segments of society and the state. Some of these confrontations, such as those in 1969 and 1977, led to the fall of constitutional government and the imposition of martial law.

A fourth conflict took place between the landed aristocracy that dominated Pakistan's political and economic life for much of the country's history and a new urban elite that began to assert itself in the late 1980s. One manifestation of this conflict was the struggle that broke out between Punjab provincial leaders and federal authorities in the late 1980s. The Punjab government continued to back the interests of the landed aristocracy, while the national government with a more liberal bent and a wider base of support—espoused the economic and social interests of urban groups and non-propertied classes. The two governments often clashed in the late 1980s, creating serious economic management problems. Issues regarding power sharing between the federal and provincial governments were largely ignored during the period of military rule in 1999–2008.

However, in the 21st century the success of any government in Pakistan—civilian or military—appeared to rest on the handling of what might be considered a fifth area of major conflict. Since 2001 the country has been confronted by a campaign of ceaseless terror, generally but not exclusively cast in religious terms, that has been mounted by religious forces opposed to secular modernism in all its forms. Government has always been mindful of the need to placate the religiously motivated populace, but finding a balance between those envisioning Pakistan as a theocratic state and those determined to pursue a liberal, progressive agenda has proved to be the most significant test. A climate of virtually irreconcilable forces has emerged, much of it manifested by external militant Islamic elements led by the al-Qaeda organization and a revived Afghan Taliban.

EDUCATION

Education Pakistan is not compulsory.

Pakistan's literacy rate is substantially lower than that of many developing countries; roughly half of all adults are literate, the literacy rate being significantly higher for males than for females. A substantial proportion of those who are literate, however, have not had any formal education.

Educational levels for women are much lower than those for men. The share of females in educational levels progressively diminishes above the primary school level.

Education suffered a major setback in the 1970s as a result of the nationalization of private schools and colleges. The reversal of that policy in the 1980s led to a proliferation of private institutions, particularly in the large cities.

In the 1980s the government also began to focus on the Islamization of the curriculum and the increased use of Urdu as the medium of instruction. During that period there was also an increase in the number of madrassas (Islamic schools) established throughout the country, particularly in poorer areas. (The added incentive of such institutions has been that most are residential schools, providing room and board at no cost in addition to a free education.)

Although many of these schools provide good quality education in religious as well as secular subjects, others are simply maktabs (primary schools) that provide no basic education, even for older students, beyond the memorization of scripture; a number of those—particularly schools found along the Afghan border—have been recruiting and training centres for jihadist groups.

The more-Westernized segments of the population prefer to send their children to private schools, which continue to offer Western-style education and instruction in English. A number of private schools offer college entrance examinations administered by educational agencies in the United States and the United Kingdom, and many graduates of these schools are educated abroad.

The division of the educational system into a private Westernized section and a state-run Islamized section has thus caused social tensions and exacerbated the problem of “brain drain,” the emigration to the West of many of the better-educated members of the population.

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